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ABSTRACT
A self- fulfilling prophecy (SFP) in neuroprognostication 
occurs when a patient in coma is predicted to have 
a poor outcome, and life- sustaining treatment is 
withdrawn on the basis of that prediction, thus directly 
bringing about a poor outcome (viz. death) for that 
patient. In contrast to the predominant emphasis in the 
bioethics literature, we look beyond the moral issues 
raised by the possibility that an erroneous prediction 
might lead to the death of a patient who otherwise 
would have lived. Instead, we focus on the problematic 
epistemic consequences of neuroprognostic SFPs in 
settings where research and practice intersect. When this 
sort of SFP occurs, the problem is that physicians and 
researchers are never in a position to notice whether 
their original prognosis was correct or incorrect, since the 
patient dies anyway. Thus, SFPs keep us from discerning 
false positives from true positives, inhibiting proper 
assessment of novel prognostic tests. This epistemic 
problem of SFPs thus impedes learning, but ethical 
obligations of patient care make it difficult to avoid SFPs. 
We then show how the impediment to catching false 
positive indicators of poor outcome distorts research 
on novel techniques for neuroprognostication, allowing 
biases to persist in prognostic tests. We finally highlight 
a particular risk that a precautionary bias towards early 
withdrawal of life- sustaining treatment may be amplified. 
We conclude with guidelines about how researchers 
can mitigate the epistemic problems of SFPs, to achieve 
more responsible innovation of neuroprognostication for 
patients in coma.
INTRODUCTION: SELF-FULFILLING PROGNOSIS 
FOR COMA PATIENTS AND THE CLINICAL 
DILEMMA
Consider Hans who at 62 has a sudden cardiac 
arrest. His blood circulation stops and, as a result, 
his brain is deprived of oxygen and nutrients. 
Although Hans is successfully resuscitated, he 
remains unconscious and is brought to intensive 
care in a postanoxic coma where he receives life- 
sustaining treatment. Over the next few days, physi-
cians use state- of- the- art prognostic techniques in 
an attempt to ascertain the extent of Hans’ brain 
damage. The available evidence suggests it is severe; 
the prognosis is poor. The treating physicians expect 
that if Hans were ever to regain consciousness at all, 
it would be with a prolonged disorder of conscious-
ness and an extremely poor quality of life. After 
discussion, the physician and Hans’ family decide to 
withdraw life- sustaining treatment, allowing Hans 
to pass away peacefully. In light of Hans’ interests 
and those of his family, we take it that this can be 
a highly reasonable decision. However, how would 
we know if the prognosis was incorrect? If the prog-
nosis was actually mistaken, we cannot learn from 
this mistake. This article explores the problems for 
responsible research and innovation in neuroprog-
nostication that are raised by this sort of case, and 
suggests guidance for mitigating these problems.
The poor prognosis for Hans was a self- fulfilling 
prophecy (SFP), because it was a prediction that 
brought about its own fulfilment. In general, we 
define an SFP as a prediction that is employed, 
or acted on, in a way that affects the very situa-
tion that the prediction is about, and, due to this, 
the predicted outcome is realised.i In saying that 
the outcome is due to the prediction and the way 
it is employed, we do not mean that these consti-
tute the sole or entire explanation of the outcome. 
Rather, the prediction and the way it was employed 
play essential parts in the explanation of how 
the outcome was actually realised. For Hans, the 
poor prognosis and the decision to withdraw life- 
sustaining treatment was the proximal cause of his 
death, regardless of what his eventual fate might 
otherwise have been. Hence, the prognosis was an 
SFP.
In light of this, we argue that it is important to 
distinguish between two general classes of SFPs. In 
some cases of SFPs, the outcome realised (here, the 
death of the patient) would not have been actually 
realised without the prediction (here, prognosis of 
poor outcome) and the way it was employed (here, 
withdrawing life- sustaining treatment). In such 
cases, the SFP changed the outcome from what it 
otherwise would have been; this we call a trans-
formative SFP. Although these cases are the most 
dramatic, we must immediately note that they are 
not the only cases of SFPs. In some other cases, the 
way a prediction is employed commandeers the 
process by which the relevant outcome is realised 
but without altering that outcome. In such a case, 
even if the outcome predicted would have been 
eventually realised in the absence of the prediction, 
i The classic conception of self- fulfilling prophecy is 
from sociologist Merton.1 Our definition departs from 
Merton’s in ways that make the notion of SFP suitable 
for analysing its epistemic implications. In particular, we 
allow that a prediction that brings about an outcome that 
still would have been otherwise realised counts as an SFP. 
Our definition also departs from Dominic Wilkinson’s 
analysis of self- fulfilling prophecies in intensive care, 
according to which these prognoses are best understood as 
‘self- reinforcing’ in that they “increase the probability of 
an outcome occurring that had some chance of occurring 
otherwise.”2 According to our conception, a particular 
prognosis is an SFP only if the outcome predicted is actu-
ally realised, and this realisation is due to the prediction.
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it was the prediction and its employment that determined how 
it actually was realised. Since such an SFP does not change 
what the outcome would have been, it is not transformative; 
it is merely an operative SFP. An operative SFP takes over the 
process without changing the eventual outcome. In our analysis, 
we will show why it is essential to consider the implications of 
both transformative and operative SFPs.
Our analysis applies to SFPs across many practical and research 
contexts. In this paper, however, we focus on SFPs in neuroprog-
nostication, especially for patients in coma after cardiac arrest.
Cardiac arrest, for nine out of ten patients, is immediately 
fatal.3 Yet, even successfully resuscitated patients usually do not 
immediately regain consciousness. They are taken to an inten-
sive care unit in a state of postanoxic coma. During cardiac 
arrest, the brain is deprived of oxygen. Predicting the extent of 
the resulting neurological impairment and the patient’s even-
tual outcome is difficult. The range of outcomes is a spectrum 
between clearly good, as with full neurological recovery, and 
clearly poor. Clearly poor outcomes typically include vegetative 
state, other prolonged disorders of consciousness and death.ii In 
the hours and days after a patient is resuscitated but still coma-
tose, the treating physicians (and the patient’s family, if they are 
involved in decision making) face a dilemma due to prognostic 
uncertainty: Either they withdraw life sustaining treatment and 
allow the patient to die peacefully, precluding the possibility of 
recovery, thereby realising an SFP. Or they continue treatment, 
in the hope of eventual recovery, with the risk that the patient 
regains consciousness without ever regaining an acceptable 
quality of life.iii
Although similarly structured dilemmas occur with other dire 
judgements in intensive care, such as a diagnosis of brain death, 
the dilemma is especially pressing in cases of postanoxic coma. 
This is because of the high degree of uncertainty in the prog-
nosis for these cases, combined with the fact that withdrawal 
of life- sustaining treatment (WLST) is the major cause of death 
for this patient group past the first 24 hours.3 iv Hence, the 
dilemma in neuroprognosis for postanoxic coma is especially 
controversial.7–9
With so much uncertainty and such high stakes, the need to 
improve neuroprognostication is pressing. The goal of prog-
nostic innovation is to improve certainty and thereby mitigate 
the severity of the dilemma we just introduced. Specifically, we 
want a high degree of certainty that (1) when the prognosis is 
good, continued treatment will indeed yield a good outcome and 
(2) when the prognosis is poor, continued treatment would not 
yield a good outcome.
Typically, clinicians, as well as most other stakeholders, focus 
on transformative SFPs.10 Because a transformative SFP brings 
about a death that would not have occurred otherwise, it gives 
rise to moral concerns.7 8 11 If the prognosis brings about a poor 
outcome (viz., death) when a poor outcome could have been 
ii Dichotomising neurological outcomes after coma based on Cerebral 
Performance Categories into good and poor is standard practice in 
neuroprognostic research, though the delineation between the two has 
shifted over time.6
iii We will not engage in the discussion of whether or when WLST in case 
of poor prognosis is morally justified. We start from the assumption that 
in some cases it can be highly reasonable to withdraw treatment on the 
basis of a poor prognosis4 5—a starting point that also informs legislation 
on WLST in an increasing number of countries.
iv Empirical study of neuroprognostic innovation practices, conducted 
by the first author, as well as clinical experience of the fourth author, 
also confirms the prevalence of WLST in response to poor outcome 
prediction.
avoided, then this is an unfortunate, tragic result. However, it is 
important to recognise that such cases, despite being tragic, are 
not necessarily morally objectionable. Prognosis, by its nature, 
takes place under conditions of uncertainty. Proceeding on the 
basis of the best evidence available is no guarantee of correct-
ness, but it is the best we can do.
A moral problem arises only if the decision- makers fail to 
acknowledge that the poor prognosis and ensuing decisions 
ensured an outcome which had been hitherto uncertain. This 
would be morally problematic, as an avoidance of account-
ability.12 Although dealing with probabilities rather than 
certainties is inevitable, we expect medical professionals to 
acknowledge any role they play in resolving the uncertainty in 
the direction of one outcome or another and communicate this 
clearly to patients and their families.10 We mention this potential 
moral problem regarding SFPs in order to, first, acknowledge its 
importance, and, second, distinguish it from the further concern 
we wish to illuminate.
Our concern is fundamentally about the epistemology of 
SFPs in neuroprognostic research, to which we turn in the next 
section. In that section we also show why SFPs’ epistemic prob-
lems, though very pressing, are difficult to solve because of 
clinicians’ obligations to their patients (who are also the rele-
vant research subjects). Having laid out the general epistemic 
problem with SFPs in neuroprognostication, we then proceed to 
detail three specific mechanisms by which this problem distorts 
research and innovation. This will put us in a position, just 
before we conclude the article, to note the risks of further moral 
problems due to the ways SFPs impede research.
SFPS’ CORE CHALLENGE TO RESPONSIBLY INNOVATING 
NEUROPROGNOSTICATION
This section begins by articulating the core epistemic problem 
that SFPs pose for neuroprognostic research. Once we have clar-
ified why this problem is pressing, we explain why—in light of 
clinicians’ duties to their patients—it is so difficult to avoid.
Prognosis is based on one or more tests measuring brain 
damage. A positive test result indicates a poor neurological 
outcome for the patient and encourages a decision to withdraw 
life- sustaining treatment. Of course, most test results are imper-
fect indicators; both true positives and false positives occur. The 
common concern about SFPs in clinical practice is the risk of 
harming some patients due to incorrect poor prognosis, bringing 
about a poor outcome that might have been otherwise averted. 
This is a moral problem due to unrecognised false positives, which 
yield transformative SFPs. The problem SFPs pose in research, 
however, is about the difficulty in distinguishing between false 
positives, yielding transformative SFPs, and true positives, which 
yield merely operative SFPs. In short, the problem in research is 
not so much a moral problem about the unnecessary, unfortu-
nate patient outcomes, but rather an epistemic problem about 
the difficulty in telling the difference between the unnecessary 
unfortunate outcomes and ineluctable ones.
Clinicians and researchers have acknowledged that SFPs 
have both clinical and research consequences,2 7 8 10–12 but, so 
far, there has been inadequate recognition about the epistemic 
value (or lack thereof) of prognoses that were self- fulfilling. We 
can fully acknowledge the distinctive and dramatic significance 
of unrecognised false positives due to their immediate clinical 
consequences, while also correcting the oversight regarding how 
SFPs impact research. As we will now explain, when predictions 
bring about their own fulfilment, researchers can never rely on, 
as genuinely informative, any feedback they receive about the 
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accuracy of those predictions. The added insight here is about 
exactly which instances of prognosis do—or do not—provide 
evidence relevant to the quality of the prognostic test.
To see the problem, return to the example of the fictional 
patient, Hans. Suppose that, according to a prognostic technique 
under development, Hans tests positive for severe brain damage. 
Ordinarily, running such a test would be an opportunity to assess 
the quality of that test, by comparing the outcome predicted on 
the basis of the test to the eventual actual outcome. In other 
words, we can assess the innovative test by checking whether the 
positive result was a true positive or a false positive. However, 
since life- sustaining treatment is withdrawn on the basis of the 
prediction, the prediction is an SFP, and Hans’s outcome is guar-
anteed to be poor. If the test was a true positive, it will appear as 
a true positive. But even if it was a false positive, it will appear as 
a true positive. There is no way of telling which is which. Hence, 
any apparent feedback we might seem to glean from observing 
the actual outcome of Hans’s case is dubious. Thus, the cases 
in which a test yields an SFP constitute an inherently unreliable 
source of feedback. Any inference about the quality of the test 
would be invalid (table 1).
In cases of self- fulfilling poor prognosis for a patient in coma, 
the explanation for the feedback’s unreliability is that, discrim-
inating between false positives and true positives is practically 
impossible due to the death of the patient. Thus, except from 
exploring ways to confirm the prognosis postmortem,13 14 it 
becomes impossible to know whether the prognosis was trans-
formative or merely operative.v
Compare this to the case of a negative test result, or any other 
test that does not yield an SFP. If the test result is negative, and 
the prognosis is good, then life- sustaining treatment will be 
continued.vi If the negative result was a true negative, we will 
observe a good outcome for the patient. In contrast, if the nega-
tive result was a false negative, we will observe a poor outcome 
for the patient. In the case of the false negative, we can catch our 
v Accordingly, false positives for brain death are even more difficult to 
catch. That is because when brain death has been diagnosed this (almost) 
always results in WLST, and so there are (almost) never opportunities to 
catch incorrect diagnoses. In other words, the diagnosis of brain death is 
inevitably an SFP, unlike prognoses of poor outcome for coma patients 
which are commonly, but not always, SFPs.
vi Not all negative test results entail a prognosis of good outcome. The 
somatosensory evoked potential (SSEP) test, for instance, only reliably 
predicts poor outcomes. A negative result, as such, does not predict a 
good outcome but can still motivate continuation of treatment.
error. The observation of an outcome that was contrary to what 
we predicted constitutes an error signal (table 2). The problem 
with positive results yielding SFPs is that, with the death of 
the patient, they eliminate any possibility for an error signal to 
alert us that the test result was inaccurate. In contrast, negative 
test results (test results which do not yield SFPs) produce error 
signals in instances where the test was incorrect.
We have just seen that while we can learn from negative test 
results, it is impossible to learn from positive test results that 
produce SFPs. Medical practitioners are usually aware of the 
potential for transformative SFPs. However, the fact that, in cases 
of transformative SFPs, the outcome would have been different 
had the prediction not been made is a condition that pollutes the 
evidential value of all the similar predictions, including the SFPs 
that were merely operative. We cannot learn from a true positive 
if we cannot be certain it was not a false positive. Hence, when 
a patient’s case is also a basis of further research, clinicians and 
researchers must extend their awareness to all SFPs, including 
those that are merely operative. Failure to do so perpetuates a 
bias that produces false positives, and thus limits the value—and 
leads to misrepresentation of the value—of the innovations that 
are developed from this research.
The epistemic impediment caused by SFPs is of special impor-
tance, not for its immediate clinical consequences, but rather 
for the research and development of new prognostic tools and 
techniques. Innovation in prognostication for postanoxic coma 
is driven by the goal of reducing uncertainty that causes clinical 
dilemmas regarding coma patients. As we have emphasised from 
the beginning, desirable advances in neuroprognostication would 
provide a high degree of certainty that (1) when the prognosis 
is good, continued treatment will indeed yield a good outcome 
and (2) when the prognosis is poor, continued treatment would 
not yield a good outcome.
Note the difficulty in testing a new prognostic method for 
satisfaction of that second desideratum. Conducting an appro-
priate experiment carries an immense moral risk. At worst, it 
is unacceptably inhumane. If there is a credible prediction of 
a poor outcome, then the only straightforward way to validate 
this prediction is to continue treatment and observe whether 
this indeed yields a poor outcome.15 However, validating the 
prediction would entail bringing about exactly the sort of 
outcome, such as an unacceptable quality of life for the patient, 
that decision- makers aim to avoid. Confirming the prediction by 
continuing treatment when it has been credibly predicted that 
this will yield a poor outcome is thus not beneficent to the patient 
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Patient dies after life- sustaining treatment is 
withdrawn, based on the poor prognosis 
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--> Transformative self- fulfilling 
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Patient dies after life- sustaining treatment is 
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and is arguably maleficent. Hence, core principles of biomedical 
ethics16 favour discontinuation of therapeutic and life- sustaining 
treatment. In short, ethical treatment of patients demands the 
SFP, even though the SFP precludes the very observations that 
would be required to test the theories and technology on which 
the prediction was based.
Thus, we have an additional dilemma, a choice between 
moral value in clinical practice and epistemic value in research: 
choosing either to prioritise the interests of the individual 
patient or to advance research to benefit future patients. Note 
that this dilemma, which is due to the innovation practice being 
at the intersection of research and care, is entirely distinct from 
the well- recognised clinical dilemma described above. This colli-
sion of values occurs precisely because the only relevant research 
subjects are necessarily also patients. It is a paradigm case of 
liminal innovation practices, in which the research- practice 
distinction cannot be upheld,17 and competing aims come into 
conflict.
In sum, observing which positive test results turned out correct 
and which turned out incorrect is required for assessing the 
quality of prognostic tests. SFPs obscure precisely this distinc-
tion. So, when SFPs occur, any feedback we seem to get about 
the success of our tests is not genuinely informative. Hence, SFPs 
prevent us from making valid assertions about the quality of our 
tests. Researchers should thus be hesitant to assert a precise false 
positive rate or precise specificity value of tests of poor outcome, 
when any cases of WLST cause SFPs.vii Thus, for the sake of 
research, avoiding SFPs is of vital importance. However, as just 
explained, preserving the interests of patients often strongly 
favours enacting the self- fulfilling prognosis.
THREE WAYS THAT THE SFP DISTORTS PROGNOSTIC RESEARCH
We have shown that, in research, when SFPs occur, we cannot 
tell the difference between false and true positives. However, 
we know from cases where life- sustaining treatment was not 
withdrawn, that false positives do occur, even with the most 
reliable tests.21 viii If there are indeed false positives, they 
remain hidden after WLST due to the epistemic challenge 
of SFPs. We now describe three ways in which these hidden 
errors can persist through various iterations of prognostic 
innovation.
First, past SFPs hide past false positive results occurring in 
established testing protocols, thus influencing clinical decision 
making in the contexts in which novel tests are being evalu-
ated.17 Cases of this type proceed along the lines of this pattern: 
A new prognostic test is being evaluated. In the case of posta-
noxic coma, this may be a combination of continuous electro-
encephalogram (cEEG) monitoring with machine learning for 
data analysis.22 Unknown to the treating clinician, who is kept 
blinded from the new test, the new test outputs a prognosis 
for a particular patient. Yet care for this patient proceeds not 
according to the deliverances of this novel test, but according 
to a series of established testing methods, perhaps including a 
vii Some studies report 0% false positive rates and 100% specificity for 
poor outcome predictions.18–20 It is wise for diligent reviewers of such 
studies to question such results in light of the pitfalls we have described.
viii As Maciel and colleagues explain, citing twelve different studies, ‘Accu-
mulating reports of survival with good neurologic recovery despite low 
likelihood based on one or multiple prognostic factors challenge current 
neuroprognostication practices.’ They continue, ‘even findings consid-
ered infallible in predicting poor outcome…have lost their immaculate 
prognostic ability, although they continue to have very low false positive 
rates.’21
somatosensory evoked potentials (SSEP) test. If one of the estab-
lished test results is positive, even if it is a false positive, the 
ensuing poor prognosis justifies (perhaps even demands) WLST. 
This constitutes a poor outcome, and this is the very outcome 
recorded and compared with the prediction derived from the 
novel test. Hence, any bias towards false positives in the estab-
lished test is present in the evaluation of the novel test, and is 
thus propagated to the novel test as it is calibrated.
This problem would be averted only if the established tests 
were perfectly accurate, or at least perfect in their specificity, 
never issuing false positives. But this will likely not be the case. 
One primary motivation for the development of a new test is 
to improve on the accuracy of the established tests. SSEP tests, 
for instance, have an estimated false positive rate of 7.7%.23ix 
Hence, the self- fulfilment of the prognosis obscures the fact 
that bias towards false positives in the earlier generation of tests 
informs clinical practice in ways that distort the evaluation of 
novel tests. To avoid letting new techniques inherit the undiscov-
ered false positives of established techniques, estimates of extant 
false positive rates (if only statistically determined2 23) must be 
considered when evaluating the new test.
The second distorting influence of SFPs is apparent when 
research and practice overlap, either in physical space, with the 
instrumentation involved, or with the personnel involved. In 
practice, it is difficult to prevent such overlaps. In fact, according 
to one recent review, only 9 out of 73 neuroprognostic studies 
reported blinding treating physicians from research results.12 A 
case of research- practice overlap may unfold as follows: The 
clinician in charge of prognosis and decision making is not 
blinded to the instrumentation being tested. So, even if the 
established prognostic test is SSEP, an electroencephalogram 
(EEG) machine that is part of a novel test may be present in the 
room with the patient and the physician.22 This invites a natural 
form of confirmation bias.24 Any hypothesis entertained about 
the evidential value of indicators in the new instrumentation 
affects not just the perceptions of the researchers but also the 
decision making of the clinician (who may well be one of the 
researchers). So, an initial hypothesis about the deliverances of 
a new test affects treatment decisions, thus affecting the patient 
outcomes. In particular, if the hypothesis suggests a poor prog-
nosis and this influences treatment decisions accordingly, the 
prognosis becomes self- fulfilling thereby spuriously confirming 
the hypothesis. So, even if the suspected positive was a false posi-
tive, this cannot be noticed. The evidence available shows the 
positive test result as a true positive. The consequence is that 
any deficit of specificity in the new test is made invisible. Quite 
appropriately, then, we already see criticism of prognostication 
studies for lacking the sort of blinding that we have come to 
expect in other sorts of clinical trials.2 10 11
The seemingly obvious solution would be to blind the 
treating physicians from all instruments and data that are part 
of the research. But this is precisely where we must face the 
fact that the division between medical research and practice is 
not sharp.1725 Although blinding the treating physicians would 
help ensure the integrity of the research, this may not always be 
consistent with providing the best possible care to the patient. 
For instance, the data from cEEG- monitoring can also be used 
to detect epileptic activity, which may subsequently be treated 
with antiepileptic drugs. Other times, there just may be no better 
ix While most studies report much lower false positive rates for SSEP, 
these studies are subject to precisely the kind of bias due to SFP we 
discuss. The study done by Amorim and colleagues (2018)23 aimed to 
develop an unbiased estimate by adjusting for WLST.
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prognostic information available than what comes from the 
experimental test, and the treating physician may have no choice 
but to explicitly request the data they were blinded from. Thus, 
even if the physician in charge of prognosis is typically blinded 
from the administration of the novel test being tested, patient 
care may favour using some of the instruments involved in the 
novel test. Blinding treating physicians should still be encour-
aged, whenever it is consistent with patient care. However, as 
soon as research data informs treatment of a patient, it is respon-
sible research practice to take that patient out of the data set 
or at least report the non- blinded element.26 Otherwise, unrec-
ognised false positives due to confirmation bias will pollute the 
data regarding the accuracy of new tests and hence misinform 
prognosis for future patients.
The third kind of distortion is the forward- looking version of 
the first kind. As a new test emerges from the realm of research 
and is put into practice, a series of new instances of prognosis 
are based on this test. Assuming the new test is not perfect in its 
specificity, there will still be false positives, which will then be 
hidden, as described before, by self- fulfilling prognoses of poor 
outcome. Just as SFPs based on an earlier prognostic method had 
the potential to distort research on a novel test, these new SFPs 
become a new source of distortion when there is an attempt to 
refine or automate the novel test. To see this, consider the novel 
cEEG- based test. Each time the new test is used, we have EEG 
readings paired with a record of the eventual outcome for the 
patient in question. As the test is run again and again with new 
patients, we have the accumulation of a large, valuable data set. 
The accumulating data has exactly the right structure to serve 
as the training and testing datasets needed to refine prognostic 
algorithms through machine learning.2218 The problem is that, 
due to self- fulfilment of prognoses, the eventual outcomes will 
be poor whenever a poor outcome was predicted. As a result, 
new data for refining the test will contain uncorrected false posi-
tives. Hence, what is ‘learnt’ is precisely the pattern of prog-
nostic judgements already encoded in the predictive methods 
intended to be refined. Thus, we have a potential for amplified 
bias through a feedback loop.27 At best, any bias towards false 
positives remains uncorrected and hinders improvement of the 
test’s specificity. At worst, bias is amplified as the test becomes 
more and more biased towards a positive result.
The obvious solution is to not train new models on data 
influenced by the use of current tests, but, just like with the 
exclusion of patients in the previous problem, this exclusion of 
potential training data may leave insufficient amounts of suit-
able data available. This deficit can, to an extent, be resolved 
by conducting collaborative research in countries where WLST 
is uncommon or prohibited. Specifically, researchers need clean 
data on patient outcomes (from places where those outcomes 
are not affected by early withdrawal) as well as prognostic read-
ings about those patients. We are optimistic about this possibility 
and see the results of research in countries where life- sustaining 
treatment is less often withdrawn28 strengthening and vali-
dating research in countries where it is commonly withdrawn 
earlier.19 That said, in contexts where WLST is uncommon, 
varying standards makes comparisons of results difficult. Other 
factors influencing outcomes like heightened pressure on limited 
resources, suboptimal intensive care, soft codes (eg, softer and 
shorter cardiopulmonary resuscitation), etc. must be taken into 
consideration.
In sum, undiscovered false positives due to SFPs caused by 
WLST impede improvement of new prognostic tests in three 
ways, each of which incorporates bias into research. The result, 
in each case, is that false positive rates of novel tests will likely 
appear lower than they actually are, and specificity will likely 
appear higher than it actually is. The earlier and the more often 
life- sustaining treatment is withdrawn, the worse this problem is.
EXACERBATING THE ASYMMETRY IN OUR PRECAUTIONARY 
BIASES?
Before concluding, we wish to briefly point out a particular risk 
that a bias towards SFPs in life- and- death cases of neuroprog-
nostication may be naturally self- reinforcing. The risk is that, if 
the epistemic issues we have been describing are not addressed, 
the moral concerns that have prompted ethicists and clinicians 
to worry about SFPs will tend to worsen rather than alleviate.
In neuroprognostication for patients in coma, both false nega-
tives and false positives are tragic. However, as we have seen, 
only false negatives are evident. In case of a false negative or 
any mistakenly optimistic prognosis, not only is the erroneous 
prediction apparent, it typically results in a quality of life the 
patient and the patient’s loved ones never would have found 
acceptable. Hence, the cases are often experienced as distressing 
and sorrowful, providing strong motivation to avoid such cases 
in the future, to whatever extent possible. The evident error 
delivers powerful feedback to improve accuracy for negative 
test results, but no such feedback exists for positive test results 
that yield SFPs. As already emphasised, in cases of false positives 
that result in SFPs, there is no error signal, that is, no readily 
apparent evidence that anything was amiss with the prediction 
(table 1). Clinicians are regularly confronted with these highly 
undesirable consequences of false negatives but never with 
those of the false positives that yield SFPs. Understandably, this 
evidential asymmetry may incline clinicians and researchers to 
increasingly lean towards predictions of poor outcome to correct 
for false negatives. But there is definitely no counterpart pres-
surex to correct for false positives and lean towards predictions 
of good outcome.
This evidential asymmetry we observed in practice comes 
on top of an already existing asymmetry between the ways we 
evaluate harms and benefits. When faced with a choice between 
a risk of great harm or a loss of comparable or even greater 
benefit, precaution already creates a bias that favours avoidance 
of harm.30 In treatment of an adult patient in coma, where a 
choice has to be made between risking a terrible outcome, and 
risking the loss of a valuable one, this precautionary bias can be 
palpable.xi With such cases, it often makes sense for clinicians 
and family members to favour avoiding the harm of subjecting 
a loved one to a severe disorder of consciousness or other unac-
ceptable quality of life.
This precautionary bias further favours the avoidance of 
false negatives, which compounds the evidential asymmetry 
between false positives and false negatives caused by SFPs. 
This means that, especially when predictions are employed 
more often or earlier, more and more patients are likely 
to not receive treatment that might have provided them a 
prolongation of a valuable life. Hence, more patients could 
meet an unnecessary, untimely demise. With that, we run 
head- on into the ethical consequences of the epistemic 
x Sometimes life- sustaining treatment is continued despite a poor prog-
nosis.29 A recovering patient then typically affects treating physicians in 
the opposite direction, making them (at least temporarily) significantly 
more careful about withdrawal.
xi In contrast, one can imagine that—with newborns in coma—the poten-
tial loss of an expected child is a harm that may flip the precautionary 
bias.
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difficulties we have been unravelling. The moral concern 
that draws attention to SFPs in neuroprognostication is thus 
prone to be exacerbated by the consequences of SFPs’ epis-
temic problems.
CONCLUSION: FACING THE EPISTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF SFPS
In this article, we have shown how SFPs distort research and 
innovation of new techniques for neuroprognostication. While 
practitioners in clinical practice have long been concerned about 
transformative SFPs that change the outcome of the patient, 
we have argued that responsible innovation in neuroprognos-
tication requires more attention to all SFPs, including operative 
ones that do not change the outcome of the patient. Only with 
this wider attention to SFPs is it possible to address the epistemic 
problems they raise.
The core epistemic problem of SFPs in research is that 
the existence of self- fulfilment, whether transformative or 
merely operative, impedes informative feedback regarding 
the accuracy of positive test results. Not being able to 
distinguish, in practice, between transformative and oper-
ative SFPs means we cannot distinguish between true posi-
tives and false positives. This both prevents detecting false 
positives and impedes improvement of the specificity of our 
tests.
Responsible innovation requires a more careful approach 
with respect to each of the three ways in which SFPs distort 
research. The following three guidelines are relevant not only 
to the researchers themselves, but also to the peer reviewers 
who should integrate this guidance into their quality assurance 
process.
1. To avoid undiscovered false positives from established tech-
nology propagating to new technology, it is imperative to 
take into account the old test’s unbiased estimates of false 
positives, adjusted for WLST, when assessing the new test.
2. When possible, treating medical staff should be completely 
blinded from neuroprognostic studies. Whenever research 
data are explicitly requested to inform treatment of a patient, 
responsible research practice requires taking that patient out 
of the data set.
3. Ideally, new models should not be trained on data influenced 
by the use of current tests. In research where models have 
been trained on tainted data, this problem should be clearly 
flagged and strategies for mitigation should be discussed.
In cases where adherence to these guidelines poses a challenge 
to collecting sufficient research data, alternatives ought then to 
be explored. We recommend considering collaborations with 
researchers in other countries where there are different prac-
tices regarding WLST, keeping in mind other limitations these 
contexts may have.
In general, it is worth reemphasising the upshot of the core 
challenge posed by SFPs: When predictions bring about their 
own fulfilment, researchers can never rely on, as genuinely 
informative, any feedback they receive about the accuracy of 
those predictions.
Learning is a fundamental part of research and innovation. If 
we have an innovation process, or research method, that limits 
how much we can learn from our successes and failures, that 
research fails to do what research is supposed to do, namely 
produce accurate learning. Responsible learning requires atten-
tion not just to the mistakes that are most apparent to us. It also 
demands that we heed the mistakes that are hidden from us, as 
with prognoses that are self- fulfilling.
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